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Rehnquist and Federalism: An Empirical
Perspective
Ruth Colker and Kevin Scott
Abstract
We attempt to articulate a vision of federalism, particularly the Rehnquist ver-
sion of federalism. We find that there is little consistent thought on the role of the
judiciary in protecting federalism. This lack of consensus makes it difficult to pre-
dict the decisions federalists might make, but we attempt to outline Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s contributions to understanding the role courts should play in protect-
ing federalism. We then attempt to assess if Rehnquist adheres to his own vision
of federalism. Using his votes since his elevation to Chief Justice in 1986, we
test several hypotheses designed to determine if Chief Justice Rehnquist demon-
strates the respect for the balance between state and federal governments which
he has articulated in so many of his opinions. We generally find support for the
proposition that Chief Justice Rehnquist adheres to the tenets of federalism. We
conclude that, while there is an ideological component to Chief Justice Rehn-
quist’s jurisprudence, there also appears to be evidence of a sincere commitment
to the protection of the line between national and state governments.
Rehnquist and Federalism:  An Empirical Perspective 
Ruth Colker* 
Kevin Scott** 
 Commentators generally agree that the Supreme Court has spurred a “federalism 
revolution” during Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s tenure.1 Nonetheless, the term 
“federalism revolution,” is unclear, in part, because the early federalists offered little 
commentary on the proper judicial role under federalism.  Arguably, this uncertainty 
continues today. 
Broadly speaking, we can think of federalism as reflecting a respect for the 
relationship between state and federal government.  Under federalism principles, Congress 
should be hesitant to interfere with state sovereignty.  Similarly, the states should respect 
Congress’ authority and not take actions that would jeopardize our national interests.  
Historically, the federalists sought a greater role for the federal government than had 
existed under the Articles of Confederation.  Today, by contrast, we often think of the 
federalists as seeking a more restrained role for Congress as compared with the states.   
But what is the role of the judiciary in this arrangement?  Is a federalist inherently a 
restraintist, believing in a limited role for the judiciary?  What is the role of the state 
judiciary as compared to the federal judiciary?  The early federalists were restraintists and 
did not envision a broad role for the judiciary in maintaining the proper federalism balance.   
                                                 
* Heck-Faust Memorial Chair, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University 
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, Texas Tech University.  We thank Ohio State University 
for providing Professor Colker with a Distinguished Scholar Award, which we were able to use to 
fund this research.  We thank the law students who helped code the cases that became the basis for 
this project. They include Reid Caryer, Nathan DeDino, John Deeds, Michelle Evans, Kerry Hodak, 
Matthew Kear, Lee Ann Rabe, and Sabrina Riggs.  
1 See generally Ruth Colker &  James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); A. 
Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New ‘On 
the Record’ Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001); William W. 
Buzbee, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001). 
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Today, by contrast, some might argue that the Court is more generally activist and 
that even the federalists consider the judiciary to have a significant role in maintaining 
what it considers to be the proper allocation of power between the federal and state 
governments. Finally, how does the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment affect 
federalism? The early federal ists could not have anticipated the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment with its direct limitations on state action and allocation of greater 
power to Congress.  We can only speculate as to how they may have modified their version 
of federalism had they known of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been a strong proponent of federalism.  He has 
repeatedly invoked federalism principles, first in dissent, and then in majority opinions.  As 
reflected in his opinions, Rehnquist’s version of federalism appears to be more restraintist 
than the version propounded by Justice Antonin Scalia.  Rehnquist also appears to consider 
the Fourteenth Amendment to create an important source of increased power for Congress 
in regulating the states.   
In this chapter, we will use both qualitative and quantitative tools to understand 
more fully Rehnquist’s version of federalism.  Using qualitative analysis, we will argue that 
Rehnquist’s version of federalism is different than the one propounded by the early 
federalists.  In addition, we will argue that it differs from that of Justice Scalia.  Then, 
using quantitative analysis, we will ask whether Rehnquist’s decisions are consistent with 
the federalism model that he propounds in his opinions.    
I. Three Versions of Federalism 
A. The Classical View of Federalism 
 Today, federalism is often considered to be a states’ rights perspective but the anti-
federalists had the strongest states’ rights perspective in the Eighteenth Century.  James 
Madison sought to create a balanced system of government whereby both the federal 
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art13
 3 
government and the states had an appropriate scope of power.  To him, “the federal 
constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests 
being referred to the national, the local, and particular to the state legislatures.2”   
 Madison emphasized that the proposed government would be a federal, not a 
national government.  The federal character was achieved through the selection of the 
Senate and the selection of the President.  Each state would receive the same number of 
Senators and those Senators would be chosen by the state legislatures.  The Presidential 
election would use a winner-take-all method of counting electoral votes on a state by state 
basis.  Madison believed that these rules would protect the states.  “Thus, each of the 
principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor 
of the state governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more 
likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, than too overbearing toward them.3” 
 In general, the Framers did not emphasize the importance of the judicial role in 
protecting the constitutional design.  Alexander Hamilton gave the most consideration to 
the proper role of the judiciary.  Hamilton understood that the judiciary, in some sense, is 
beholden to the other branches of government because it cannot enforce its rulings.  Hence, 
some might call it the “weakest of the three departments of power.4”  Yet, the independence 
of the judiciary was an essential aspect of the proposed new government.  “[T]here is no 
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”  
He then delineated the role of the courts in the proposed system of government: 
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a 
limited constitution . . . . Limitations . . . can be preserved in practice no other 
way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty is must be 
to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.  
                                                 
2Federalist No. 10 at 22. 
3Federalist No. 45 at 100.   
4Federalist No. 78 at 143. 
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Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would 
amount to nothing. 
 
Hamilton does not specify whether this judicial role should be a broad or narrow one but his 
recognition that the judiciary is the weakest branch might suggest that he thought the 
judiciary should use its powers sparingly to maintain its integrity. 
 More modern writers also contemplated the judicial role under federalism.  James 
Thayer and Herbert Wechsler have played a central role in the development of a judicial 
role for federalists, arguing for a restrained judicial role.  Thayer defended the position that 
courts should only declare laws unconstitutional “when those who have the right to make 
laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, – so clear that it is 
not open to rational question.”5 Nonetheless, he considered it important for courts to have 
the power to declare laws unconstitutional. Otherwise, the constitution “is reduced to 
nothing.”  
 Although Thayer argued for judicial restraint, he suggested that the Supreme Court 
should be sensitive to whether a case is being appealed from a state or federal court. In this 
context, he makes two important points.  First, he emphasizes the importance of the 
supremacy clause.  “If a State legislature passes a law which is impeached in the due course 
of litigation before the national courts, as being in conflict with the supreme law of the land, 
those courts may have to ask themselves a question different from that which would be 
applicable if the enactments were those of a co-ordinate department . . . The judiciary now 
speaks as representing a paramount constitution and government, whose duty it is, in all 
its departments, to allow to that constitution nothing less than its just and true 
interpretation; and have fixed this, to guard against any inroads from without.”    
                                                 
5 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 144 (1893) 
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 Second, and related, Thayer postulates that judges should be generally deferential to 
the views of a coordinate branch of government.  Hence, state court judges would be 
deferential to the views of the state legislature and be disinclined to invalidate their 
legislation as violative of the constitution.  By emphasizing the importance of deferring to 
the views of a coordinate branch of government, Thayer implied that a federal judge need 
not defer to the views of the state legislature, particularly when the state’s highest court 
has validated those legislative acts.  One might argue, then, that a federalist judge would 
be less deferential to a state court’s review of state action than similar review by a federal 
court. 
 One must be careful not to overstate Thayer’s view about the federal courts’ 
relationship to state government.  Thayer’s view is predicated on the assumption that it 
will be extremely rare for state government to violate the Constitution because his work 
predates use of the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle for incorporation.  From his 
perspective, states had broad authority to enact legislation.  The only meaningful limitation 
on the states would be the Supremacy Clause – when Congress had the power to pre-empt a 
field, chose to pre-empt the field, and the states did not honor those limitations.  Thayer 
would therefore have expected that courts would rarely deal with situations in which the 
states had arguably violated the Constitution.  But in instances in which the states may 
have violated the Supremacy Clause, he did not consider it likely that the state courts 
would vigorously enforce that constitutional principle.  Hence, the federal courts would play 
an important role in protecting the federal government’s prerogatives. 
 Herbert Wechsler also did not consider courts to have a central role in the 
maintenance of a federal system.  “[T]he national political process in the United States – 
and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central 
government – is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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center on the domain of the states . . . . Federal intervention as against the states is thus 
primarily a matter for congressional determination in our system as it stands.”6 
 Like Thayer, Wechsler envisioned the function of the courts in a federal system to be 
preservation of the Supremacy Clause, but this did not mean that he envisioned the courts 
as actively engaged in the policy-making process—that was to be left to the elected 
branches.  According to Wechsler, “while the Court has an important function in [pre-
emption], the crucial point is that its judgments here are subject to reversal by Congress, 
which can consent to action by the states that otherwise would be invalidated . . . . The 
Court makes the decisive judgment only when – and to the extent that – Congress has not 
laid down the resolving rule.”   On the other hand, Wechsler saw a fundamentally different 
role for the courts in protecting individual rights:   
In this latter area of the constitutional protection of the individual against 
the government, both federal and state, subordination of the Court to 
Congress would defeat the purpose of judicial mediation.  For this is where 
the political processes cannot be relied upon to introduce their own 
correctives – except to the limited extent that individuals or small minorities 
may find a champion in some important faction 
 
 The classical version of federalism and the Thayer/Wechsler version are only 
modestly different.  Both versions are restraintist while recognizing a legitimate 
federal judicial role in protecting the Supremacy Clause.  The important difference 
is that Wechsler envisions a somewhat active role for the courts in the protection of 
individual rights, because he takes account of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
development of his views.      
 B. Federalism Since the 1970’s:  The Demise of Wechsler 
Although the early federalists appear to have advocated a restrained role for the 
judiciary, a more activist version of federalism began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s. 
                                                 
6 Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism:  The Role of the States in the Composition 
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954)  
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art13
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Some political scientists have argued that this development was not a genuine reflection of 
federalist principles; instead, it was an example of the Supreme Court imposing its 
ideological preferences on Congress.7  Within legal circles, a genuine federalism explanation 
is offered, with commentators suggesting that the Court has grown wary of Congress 
dramatically overstepping its proper authority.8  We have entered the federalism versus 
political ideology debate in previous work but leave that issue to the side for the purposes of 
this chapter.9 
The modern federalist position on the Tenth Amendment is reflected in Justice 
Powell’s dissenting opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority .10  
Justice Powell argued for a vigorous judicial role to protect the states when Congress 
violates the Tenth Amendment by overreaching in its use of the commerce clause, stating: 
“Professor Wechsler, whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court 
today, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with current 
reality.”  To Powell, the growth of the federal government had obviated the position 
advocated by Wechsler and his predecessors.  Justice Powell also disagreed with Wechsler’s 
premise that members of Congress, because they are elected from states, would protect 
state sovereignty.  Instead, he posited that they would have a national, not local, 
                                                 
7 See generally, Sue Davis, Rehnquist and State Courts: Federalism Revisited, 45 THE WESTERN 
POLITICAL QUARTERLY  772 (1992); Harold J. Spaeth, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: An Assessment in 
AN ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD: ESSAYS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 94-95 
(D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. ed. 1991); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).   
8 See. e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996); John C. 
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997). 
9 See Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action During the 
Rehnquist Era, 88 VIRGINIA L. REV.1301 (2002). 
10469 U.S. 528 (1984). 
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perspective. The modern federalist position has therefore evolved from one of judicial 
restraint to one of active judicial enforcement of the principles of state sovereignty.11  
 Justice Scalia has been the bluntest proponent of action by the Court in defense of 
federalism.  He has said: 
My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the Court with the 
presumption of constitutionality.  That presumption reflects Congress’s 
status as a coequal branch of government with its own responsibilities to the 
Constitution.  But if Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do 
anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the 
Constitution . . . then perhaps that presumption is unwarranted.12 
 
This runs contrary to the assertions of some early federalists like Thayer and Wechsler.  
Thayer, in particular, argued that the Court should presume the constitutionality of 
Congress’s conduct and only strike such legislation where there is “no room for reasonable 
doubt.”  Scalia criticized the Congress’ recent practice of creating expedited procedures for 
the courts to assess the constitutionality of legislation.  Scalia argued that by doing so, 
Congress is flouting its unconstitutional conduct by readily acknowledging that it may have 
passed unconstitutional legislation. 
 This second version of federalism is less restraintist than the view offered by the 
early federalists.  In addition, it appears to be more protective of states’ interests.  We 
would therefore expect that if this model explained the voting behavior of a federalist jurist 
that voting behavior would be consistent with the views expressed by states in amicus 
briefs.    
C. Rehnquist’s Federalism 
                                                 
11 See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 
VILLANOVA L. REV. 951, 952 (2001) (arguing that “federal courts have a role in safeguarding state 
sovereignty that is as legitimate and essential as that generally acknowledged to be both necessary 
and constitutionally mandated for the protection of individual rights.”) 
12Antonin Scalia, Telecommunications Law and Policy Symposium (Apr. 18, 2000).  (transcribed from a videotape 
loaned by the Law Review of Michigan State University – Detroit College of Law). 
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While Rehnquist played an early and active role in pushing the Court to adopt a 
more activist posture with respect to enforcing federalist principles, his version of 
federalism does not appear to be as activist as the one propounded by Scalia because, like 
Wechsler and Thayer, he seems to envision a role for the Court in the protection of 
individual rights even when Congressional protection of individual rights seems to trounce 
on state’s rights. 
Associate Justice Rehnquist played an early role in the articulation of a strong role 
for the federal courts in protecting federalism in his dissent in Fry v. United States,13 three 
years after joining the Court.  In 1975, he was the lone Justice to articulate this 
perspective.  The issue in Fry was the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 
1970, which authorized the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize wages and 
salaries at levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970.  Not only did this statute 
apply to the workforce generally, but it was understood to apply to the conduct of state 
government.  Hence, two state employees brought suit to invalidate the statute so that they 
could receive a salary increase that the state of Ohio had approved.  The state employees 
challenged the statute under the Tenth Amendment as improperly interfering with state 
sovereignty.   
The majority upheld the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act, relying 
on the Court’s holding in Maryland v. Wirtz14 that the Fair Labor Standards Act could 
constitutionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by states.  (Douglas and Stewart 
dissented, arguing that the Tenth Amendment protected state sovereignty from such 
regulation, given the excessive cost that would accompany enforcement of the FLSA.)  
Justice Stewart joined the majority in Fry; Justice Douglas would have dismissed the writ 
                                                 
13 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
14 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
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as improvidently granted.  Hence, in dissent, Justice Rehnquist was alone in extending 
Douglas and Stewart’s dissent in Wirtz to Fry.   
Justice Rehnquist was not on the Court when Wirtz was decided so Fry was his first 
opportunity to convey his view of federalism and the judicial role.  Building on the Court’s 
decision in Hans v. Louisiana15 in which it relied on the “pre-understanding” of the 
Eleventh Amendment to protect a state from litigation, Rehnquist argued that many 
aspects of state sovereignty are protected “quite apart from the provisions of the Tenth 
Amendment.” “Both Amendments [the Tenth and Eleventh] are simply examples of the 
understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the States were 
sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative authority could be 
superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to act, Congress was 
nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just another individual or business 
enterprise subject to regulation.” 
Having articulated an activist role for the judiciary in safeguarding federalism, 
Rehnquist still had a challenging set of facts to assess, because the wage and salary ceilings 
were put into place as part of national emergency legislation.  One might argue under the 
early federalist model that the states should defer to Congress in times of national 
emergency, so the legislation should be upheld as constitutional.  Rehnquist did not offer 
much scrutiny of the facts.  He simply concluded: “nor do I believe that the showing of 
national emergency made here is sufficient to make this case one in which congressional 
authority may be derived from sources other than the Commerce Clause.”  He did 
acknowledge, however, that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as a general 
matter, can provide the authority for Congress to “impose significant restrictions on what 
would otherwise be thought state prerogatives.”  No Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment 
                                                 
15 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
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argument, however, was available in this case.  Rehnquist therefore argued that Wirtz 
should be overruled but that South Carolina v. Katzenbach,16 upholding the Voting Rights 
Act, could still be understood to be valid precedent. 
Rehnquist recognized that he was calling for the overturning of precedent which is 
inconsistent with the notion of stare decisis.  He subscribed to a weak version of stare 
decisis in order to justify that step.  He said: “important decisions of constitutional law are 
not subject to the same command of stare decisis as are decisions of statutory questions.”17 
This weak version of stare decisis would be quite inconsistent with the tenor of Thayer’s 
judicially cautious federalism.  Rehnquist justified this weak version of stare decisis in the 
federalism context:  “Surely there can be no more fundamental constitutional question than 
that of the intention of the Framers of the Constitution as to how authority should be 
allocated between the National and State Governments.” 
Rehnquist made two important contributions to the development of a federalism 
jurisprudence in Fry.  First, he carved out an activist judicial role, even if that role required 
the overturning of precedent.  Second, he recognized the power of Congress to regulate 
states and intrude on their sovereignty under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
but not under the Commerce Clause.  In 1975, he was alone in taking this view. 
Within a year, Rehnquist commanded a 5-4 majority of support for his federalism 
views as articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery.18  Justice Blackmun filed the 
pivotal concurrence to give Rehnquist a five vote majority.  (Ironically, Robert Bork 
defended the federal statute as Solicitor General.)  The issue in Usery was essentially the 
issue in Wirtz – the constitutionality of Congress applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
state employees.  Only two members of the Court had dissented from that conclusion in 
                                                 
16 388 U.S. 301 (1966). 
17 421 U.S. at 559. 
18 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 12 
1968.  Now, however, a majority of the Court is willing to strike down the FLSA as applied 
to the states because it results in the “forced relinquishment of important governmental 
activities.” Not only did the FLSA impose substantial costs on state and local government 
but it “displaces state policies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of 
those governmental services which their citizens require.” 
Although the decision had far-reaching implications in reversing the recent decision 
in Wirtz, the decision had cautious elements.  First, Rehnquist was careful to note that the 
decision applied only to Congress’ use of the commerce clause.  He left open the possibility 
that Congress might regulate the states and “affect integral operations” under the spending 
power or Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Rehnquist distinguished 
rather than overruled Fry.  In contrast to the FLSA, he found that the Economic 
Stabilization Act, at issue in Fry, was a limited, temporary, national measure which 
reduced the pressures upon state budgets rather than increased them.  Thus, Rehnquist 
left open the door the possibility that Congress, in the future, could use its emergency 
powers to enact legislation which might intrude upon state sovereignty.  Nonetheless, 
Rehnquist made no attempt to distinguish Wirtz.  He directly overruled that precedent, 
implicitly relying on his view expressed in Fry that constitutional decisions are entitled to 
less weight as stare decisis. 
Rehnquist reiterated the moderate aspects of his federalism in Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer.19 With no dissenters, Rehnquist again wrote the opinion of the Court.  The issue in 
this case was the authority of Congress to permit monetary damage awards against the 
states in suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Court upheld 
this congressional authority, finding that Congress’ powers under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment necessarily limited the principle of state sovereignty embodied in 
                                                 
19 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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the Constitution.  Fitzpatrick therefore continued the line o f reasoning that Rehnquist had 
acknowledged in Fry – that cases involving Congress’ authority under Section Five present 
different problems than cases involving Congress’ commerce clause authority. 
Although Rehnquist still adhered to the view that Congress’ Section Five authority 
is broader than its Commerce Clause authority, with respect to regulating state action, his 
decision in Rome v. United States20 suggested that he had moderated his views on the 
extent of Congress’ authority under Section Five.   
The issue in Rome was the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 
applied to Rome, Georgia. In 1965, the city of Rome made a number of changes to its 
electoral scheme; under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, these changes required 
preclearance.  Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required that the Attorney General may 
only preclear a voting change if it “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”21 The City claimed that 
Section 5 was unconstitutional, because Congress does not have authority under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to ban practices that are discriminatory in effect, but lack 
discriminatory intent. 
In a 6-3 decision, the majority upheld Congress’ use of its Fourteenth Amendment 
authority to create the preclearance rules.  Justice Rehnquist dissented, issuing an opinion 
that was joined by Justice Stewart.  (Justice Stewart, of course, had dissented from the 
majority’s holding in Wirtz and had a longstanding concern for federalism.)  Echoing his 
strong dissent in Fry, he castigated the Court for abandoning its proper judicial role.  He 
said: 
While the presumption of constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of 
the Federal Government or of one o f the States, it is this Court which is ultimately 
                                                 
20 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
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responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those entities.  
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974). Today’s decision is nothing less than a total abdication of that authority, 
rather than an exercise of the deference due to a coordinate branch of the 
government. 
 
The difference in tone between Rome and Usery is striking.  In Usery, Rehnquist was 
willing to revisit his own dissenting opinion in Fry and suggest limiting principles to a far-
reaching decision. In Rome, he came close to Scalia’s view of abandoning deference to a 
coordinate branch of government altogether. The difference in tone, however, can easily be 
attributed to the different role of these decisions.  Usery was a majority decision for the 
Court in which Rehnquist was trying to keep together a flimsy five vote majority (which 
disappeared in less than a decade in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.)22  In Rome, Rehnquist was writing freely in dissent, only trying to maintain the 
vote of one of his longstanding federalist compatriots.   It is not surprising that his 
language in dissent would be more extreme although it probably hints to his future path 
where he often joins other federalists in striking down federal legislation, even legislation 
enacted pursuant to Congress’ Section Five authority. 
Rehnquist’s opinions lend support to two different models of federalism. When he 
writes in dissent, he sometimes sounds more like the activist Scalia model of federalism 
than like the early restraintist model of federalism.  But when he writes the opinion of the 
Court, he sounds more restraintist and more deferential to Congress’ powers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Which model best describes his opinions from a quantitative 
perspective?  Does Rehnquist’s model of federalism have restraintist elements?  Is he more 
deferential to Congress when it has invoked its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment?   
III. Hypotheses 
                                                 
22 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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 Although we have identified three different models of federalism, there are some 
elements common to each of these versions. Under these common elements, we posit that a 
judge who adheres to federalism would: 
q First, demonstrate greater respect for the decisions of state courts than federal courts.23 
q Second, respect the articulated wishes of the states, as demonstrated by amici briefs 
submitted by the states. 
q Third, treat states more as an equal to the federal government than a non-federalist 
would.  This is not to say that a federalist would treat states as equals to the federal 
government, but they should be less willing to invalidate state action than those of non-
federalists. 
q Fourth, there should be some notion of judicial restraint.  The federalists should be 
more restrained than the nonfederalists even if there is a range of restrained behavior 
among the federalists.  
q Fifth, federalists should not hesitate to favor the federal government over the states 
when the Supremacy Clause is at issue. 
 Additionally, these behaviors should be observable regardless of the ideological 
implications of a vote to validate or invalidate action.  We do not expect ideology to fail to 
explain the votes of justices who have articulated a special interest in preserving the 
federalist structure, but we do expect an independent effect for the hypothesized behaviors 
once we have accounted for the ideological implications of each case. 
 Finally, there may be different views of federalism articulated by current members 
of the Court.  Chief Justice Rehnquist has suggested that there is a special place for the 
rights of the individual and that the courts might be part of the scheme of protection of 
                                                 
23 Although Thayer might reject this hypothesis, it does appear to be central to modern federalism as 
discussed by Sue Davis. See infra note 26. 
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those rights.  This position, articulated first by Thayer and later by Wechsler, may manifest 
itself in the voting record of Chief Justice Rehnquist, but it may not emerge in the voting 
behavior of Justice Scalia, who has not articulated a similar commitment. 
 III. Research Design 
 Very little quantitative analysis of judicial adherence to doctrine has occurred in 
either political science or legal literature.  The advantage of such an approach is that it 
permits us to ascertain the degree to which the justices’ votes match the language they 
craft in their opinions.  Several political scientists have attempted similar analyses of legal 
doctrines, but few have carefully tested an interest in federalism as a guiding judicial 
principle.24  For this analysis, we collected data on any case decided by the Supreme Court 
where the constitutionality of a state action was considered during the 1986-2002 terms of 
the Supreme Court.  Details of the research design, including a discussion of how the 
ideology of the underlying state action was measures, are discussed in Appendix A.25  
Additionally, each case was coded for the issue area covered by the Court, and we included 
independent variables to measure cases that covered individual rights and raised 
Supremacy Clause issues.  Because the dependent variable (the justice votes to invalidate 
or validate the government action under review) is dichotomous, probit  is an appropriate 
statistical tool, as we discuss in Appendix A.  We present the results as the predicted 
probability that a justice will vote to invalidate a state action. 
                                                 
24 Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for Deference? The Supreme Court and Judicial 
Review, 57 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY  131 (2004); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An 
Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 113 (2002).  See also Sue Davis, 
Rehnquist and State Courts:  Federalism Revisited, 45 WESTERN POL. Q. 774 (1992). 
25 For a discussion of the role of these organizations, see J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, 
The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 233, 
239 (2004). These two variables were, on average, negative.  If states or state organizations file 
amicus curiae briefs, they generally do so to urge the Court to uphold a state action. 
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 Turning to our first hypothesis, we suggest that a federalist will be sensitive to the 
decisions rendered by state courts, particularly when state courts uphold choices made by 
the other branches of state government.   
Table 1: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist Voting to Affirm by Lower Court 
Treatment 
  Type of Lower Court 
  Federal Court:  
Probability of  Vote to 
Affirm 
State Court:  
Probability of Vote to 
Affirm 
Invalidated State Action 18.67% 12.24% Lower Court 
Decision Validated State Action 62.38% 75.92% 
 
 Table 1 reflects the predicted probability that Rehnquist will vote to affirm the lower 
court decision. (Bold cell entries in all tables are statistically significant.) Chief Justice 
Rehnquist votes to affirm state courts more often when they validate state action than 
when they invalidate state action.  And when the lower court has validated state action, he 
votes to affirm state courts more frequently than he does federal courts.26  Sue Davis argues 
for this view of federalism in her assessment of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist’s votes on 
reviews of criminal convictions, concluding that a commitment to state autonomy means 
allowing state courts to be the final arbiters of state policy.27  We observe this pattern of 
                                                 
26 The difference in rate of affirmance when the lower court invalidated state action is not 
statistically significant.  All of the other differences in predicted probabilities in Tables 1 are 
statistically significant.  For all of the tables, the baseline predicted probability is calculated based 
on a case which was invalidated by a lower state court, was a conservative state action, did not 
involve individual rights or premption, and had the average number of net amici for states (-6.07, or 
6.07 states favoring validation) and state organizations (-.54, or .54 organizations favoring 
validation).  That baseline is 9.02% predicted probability of a vote to invalidate.  Differences which 
are statistically significantly different from that value will be marked by bold cell entries. 
27 Sue Davis, Rehnquist and State Courts: Federalism Revisited , 45 WESTERN POL Q. 774 (1992).  
Davis argues that Rehnquist rejects this respect for state courts in favor of ideology (reversing 
decisions which overturn convictions and affirming those which uphold convictions).  Our results 
demonstrate that there appears to be some deference to state courts even after ideology has been 
accounted for. 
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greater deference to state court than federal court decisions, but only when a lower court 
has validated the state action. 
 A federalist should also be sensitive to the articulated wishes of the states, 
expressed by the states themselves in amicus briefs, or by organizations which represent 
several state governments or government officials.  In any given case, the justices may not 
be familiar with the sentiments of the states as a group: Massachusetts (or Texas) may be 
pursuing a policy which many of the other states find odious, so a federalist may not know 
where the weight of state interests lie.  However, if states themselves or the organizations 
which represent the states weigh in on the case in the form of amicus curiae briefs, then the 
justices have a better sense of the collective wishes of the states.  We argue that the more 
states that favor invalidation of a state action, the more a federalist justice should be 
willing to vote to invalidate the state action (the reverse would also be true).  But we find 
that amicus participation by state governments or by state government organizations does 
not correlate with the voting behavior of Chief Justice Rehnquist.   
Table 2: Predicted Probability of Vote for Invalidation, States and 
Intergovernmental Lobby as Amicus 
  States State Orgs. 
Above Average favoring Invalidation 12.68% 11.72% 
Average 12.24% 12.24% 
Number of 
signers on 
briefs Above Average favoring Validation 11.82% 12.78% 
 
A change in the number of states or state organizations signing briefs has no effect on the 
predicted probability of Chief Justice Rehnquist voting to invalidate the government action.  
On average, 4.7 states sign briefs to favor validation of state action.  Increasing that 
number by one standard deviation (16.6 states favoring validation) has no statistically 
significant impact on the likelihood of Chief Justice Rehnquist voting to validate the 
government action (the reverse is true as well).  The effect of the intergovernmental lobby 
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also lacks statistical significance: if anything, it is in the direction opposite of the one we 
predicted. It appears that the efforts of states and of organizations which represent their 
interests are wasted, at least insofar as Chief Justice Rehnquist is concerned. 
 We also hypothesize that federalists will be more deferential to the states than their 
brethren who reject the label of federalist.  This suggests that there is no absolute standard 
by which a federalist can be judged, but rather that the justices’ behavior can only be 
explained in relation to one another.  For comparison to Chief Justice Rehnquist, we turn to 
Justice Stevens, primarily because they have both served over the entire 1986-2002 period 
under analysis here.  If we expand our regression to include review of both state and federal 
actions (and retain the same independent variables), it becomes clear that Justice Stevens 
approaches state statutes with a more critical eye than he does federal statutes.  The same 
can not be said, however, for Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Table 3: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist and Stevens Voting to Invalidate 
Government Action by Type of Government 
 
  Justice 
  Rehnquist Stevens 
State Action 12.24% 71.47% Type of Action 
Under Review Federal Action 9.41% 49.47% 
 
 Justice Stevens is more than 20% more likely to vote to invalidate an action taken 
by a state government than one taken by the federal government, even after the ideological 
direction of the underlying action (though it is assumed to be conservative for these models) 
and the treatment by the lower courts are considered.  Justice Rehnquist appears 
nominally more likely to invalidate state than federal action, but the difference is not 
statistically significant (it is for Justice Stevens).  These results suggest that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist comes closer to treating state governments as equal to the federal government 
than does Justice Stevens.   
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 Like respect for state versus federal action, judicial restraint can only be understood 
in a comparative context.  To determine if Chief Justice Rehnquist and other justices who 
claim to be federalists refrain from invalidating state action more than their colleagues, we 
calculated overall invalidation rates for each of the nine current justices, and then assessed 
the rate at which they invalidated liberal and conservative actions taken by the states.   
Table 4: Predicted Invalidation Rate by Justice, Conservative and Liberal State 
Action 
 Ideology of State 
Action 
 
Justice Conservative Liberal Absolute 
Difference 
Rehnquist 12.24% 28.53% 16.29% 
Scalia 12.86% 33.25% 20.39% 
Thomas 10.03% 31.99% 21.96% 
O’Connor 21.83% 37.73% 15.90% 
Kennedy 22.89% 33.97% 11.08% 
Ginsburg 80.66% 39.31% 41.35% 
Souter 57.92% 28.29% 29.63% 
Breyer 64.50% 33.01% 31.49% 
Stevens 71.47% 32.74% 38.73% 
 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to qualify as a practitioner of judicial restraint, if 
only by relative terms.  While he certainly invalidates liberal state actions at a much 
greater rate than he invalidates conservative state action, the difference in his predicted 
invalidation rates for liberal and conservative state actions (16.29%) is smaller than every 
other justice except Justices Kennedy and O’Connor.  Notably, the predicted difference is 
much smaller than that of the more liberal justices as well.28  Justice Rehnquist’s predicted 
invalidation rate is also the lowest of the current nine justices on the Court.  If judicial 
restraint can be read as a reluctance to interfere with the policy decisions made by officials 
                                                 
28 Other quantitative analyses have suggested that the liberal justices appear to be more ideological 
than the conservative justices.  See Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for Deference? 
The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 131 (2004). 
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of the other branches, then Chief Justice Rehnquist, at least in relative terms, appears to 
demonstrate some evidence of restraintist behavior.  As reflected in the writings of 
Rehnquist and Scalia, we also see that Scalia has a less restraintist perspective than 
Rehnquist although he is more restrained than the nonfederalists.  Our data therefore 
supports the view that federalists are comparatively restrained even if they differ among 
themselves in the degree to which they are restrained. 
 When looking at votes which assess the constitutionality of federal action, we find 
that the overall rates do not change significantly, but the difference between rates of 
invalidation for liberal and conservative government action are considerably greater.  Table 
5 reports these results. 
Table 5: Invalidation Rate by Justice, Conservative and Liberal Federal Action 
 Ideology of Federal 
Action 
  
Justice Conservative  Liberal Absolute 
Difference 
Rehnquist 9.41% 23.57% 14.16% 
Scalia 9.32% 26.71% 17.39% 
Thomas 17.59% 45.25% 27.66% 
O’Connor 9.91% 20.58% 10.67% 
Kennedy 15.68% 24.87% 9.19% 
Ginsburg 81.25% 40.15% 41.10% 
Souter 54.60% 25.50% 29.10% 
Breyer 51.3% 21.80% 29.50% 
Stevens 49.47% 15.20% 34.27% 
  
The liberal-conservative difference for Chief Justice Rehnquist is 14.16% for federal actions, 
compared to 16.29% for state actions. Chief Justice Rehnquist does therefore appear to 
engage in some form of judicial restraint, but an ideological component exists to his 
decisions to validate or invalidate government actions. 
 When a claim about the use of the Supremacy Clause is raised, we hypothesize that 
a federalist will be more likely to strike state action out of a desire to preserve the proper 
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place of the federal and state government. Calculating the predicted probability for cases 
where federal preemption of state law is an issue, we find that Chief Justice Rehnquist is 
much more likely to strike the state action than when preemption claims have not been 
raised. 
Table 6: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist Voting to Invalidate State Action, 
Supremacy Clause Cases 
  Rehnquist 
Preemption Not Issue 12.24% State Action: 
Preemption is the Issue 45.97% 
 
 
 When the Court chooses to decide a case on Supremacy Clause grounds, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist becomes far more critical of state actions.  In cases in the baseline 
category, the invocation of a Supremacy Clause claim makes Rehnquist more than three 
times more likely to vote to invalidate the state action under review.  Most of the clearest 
articulations of federalist doctrine have acknowledged that the preservation of a federal 
system of government requires that both the state and federal government respect the 
spheres of authority for one another.  Our analysis here clearly suggests that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist is not reluctant to use the authority of the Supreme Court to police those 
boundaries when necessary. 
 Finally, one might expect that Rehnquist would be more protective of individual 
rights than Justice Scalia, because he envisions a bigger role for Congress’ right to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment under its Section Five powers.   These different views play out 
when one evaluates their votes cast in cases where the validity of state action is at issue.29  
The results for Rehnquist and Scalia are comparable as reflected in the table below.  They 
                                                 
29 Cases dealing with individual rights are those dealing with First Amendment freedoms, Equal 
Protection claims, Procedural Due Process, Substantive Due Process, and Sect. 1983 damage suits. 
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are both somewhat more likely to invalidate state action when cases involve individual 
rights but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 7: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist Vote to Invalidate, Individual Rights 
Cases 
  Justice 
  Rehnquist Scalia 
Does not Involve Indiv. Rights 12.24% 12.86% State Action: 
Involves Indiv. Rights 15.54% 15.28% 
 
 Finally, we note that the patterns which we have observed above generally 
transcend voting strictly related to ideology.  In the most absolute sense, a conservative 
justice motivated solely by ideology would strike liberal state actions and  uphold 
conservative state actions. We find evidence of ideological behavior in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s votes, but the ideological direction of the underlying statute is clearly not the 
sole determinant of his votes.  He is significantly more likely to strike liberal state actions 
than conservative state actions, as demonstrated in Table 6. 
Table 8: Predicted Probability of Vote to Invalidate, by Ideology of State Action 
  Rehnquist 
Conservative  12.24% State Action: 
Liberal 28.53% 
 
But ideology is not the sole determinant of Rehnquist’s voting behavior.  As 
demonstrated above, he is also sensitive to whether the case involves the issue of pre-
emption, which government, state or federal, is acting, and what lower court handled the 
case and what decision the lower court reached.  If Chief Justice Rehnquist were motivated 
only by ideology, we would not expect any other factor to be a significant predictor of his 
votes. 
IV. Conclusion 
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 Overall, we find general support for the proposition that Rehnquist behaves 
according to the dictates of federalism.  He demonstrates more respect for state courts than 
federal courts, particularly when state courts validate state action.  Rehnquist’s vision of 
federalism appears to equate to that articulated by Sue Davis—respect for the decisions of 
state courts, particularly when the state court affirms state action. 
 Rehnquist does not seem particularly solicitous of the requests made by the states or 
the intergovernmental lobbyists as amicus curiae .  Our results suggest that amicus briefs 
by state actors do not have a significant effect on Rehnquist’s voting behavior.  Because of 
the increased proliferation of amicus briefs in recent years, this may be an important 
finding.  One explanation for this lack of effect is that the authors of amicus briefs do not 
typically target Rehnquist because they consider his vote to be predictable. Instead, they 
may be targeting the perceived “swing Justice” such as Justice O’Connor.  We expect to 
explore this issue further in future research.   
Nonetheless, Rehnquist does fulfill the other criteria we outline for a federalist: 
treating the states on a more equal basis to the federal government than nonfederalists, 
exercising what appears to be judicial restraint, and respecting the proper role of the 
federal and state governments when the Supremacy Clause is invoked. 
Our empirical results suggest that the more restrained version of Rehnquist’s 
federalism that appears in his opinions for the Court better reflect his federalism than his 
dissents.  His recent opinion in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs30in which 
he wrote the opinion for the Court upholding the constitutionality of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act is consistent with this restrained version of Rehnquist’s federalism. 
Despite Rehnquist’s purported concern for the Fourteenth Amendment as an important 
contributor to our system of government, we could find no evidence that Rehnquist has 
                                                 
30 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
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incorporated the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment into his version of federalism in 
his individual rights decisions decided under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.31  
Like the federalism of Scalia, Rehnquist’s federalism does not seem to be  sensitive to the 
importance of the Fourteenth Amendment in our federalist system.   
 One of our most interesting findings was that Rehnquist’s voting behavior can be 
explained, in part, by the ideology of the underlying state action.  This result is certainly 
not surprising to social scientists who think that judicial voting behavior can be explained 
entirely by politics.  But, maybe surprisingly, we found that Rehnquist’s ideological 
influence may be less than the ideological influence of many of the Courts’ liberals.  This 
finding also would benefit from further research but may be affected by the Court’s role in 
defining its own docket, as well as the difficulty in applying the conservative/liberal label.  
Whether government action is liberal or conservative appears to be a factor influencing 
whether the Court accepts certiorari in a particular case.  In our data base, the Supreme 
Court reviewed (i.e. granted certiorari) in 455 instances of conservative government action 
and only 153 liberal government actions. The large number of conservative government 
actions under review is attributable, in large part, to the substantial number of criminal 
law cases reviewed by the Court.  Of the 455 conservative governmental actions, 209 
involved criminal law cases.   
 Empirical analysis, however, has its limitations.  We were not able to use empirical 
tools to see if Rehnquist tended to be more deferential to Congress when Congress invoked 
its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the commerce 
clause or spending power.  The large number of criminal law cases may have skewed our 
analysis. (230 of the 608 cases in the data base involved criminal law.)  We did run our 
                                                 
31 Hibbs was decided under Section Five, not Section One, of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Section 
Five cases involve the scope of Congress’ power; Section One cases involve the question of whether 
states violated the due process or equal protection rights of individuals. 
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analysis, however, without the criminal law cases and the results did not change 
significantly.  Nonetheless, a more refined analysis of the criminal law category would be 
useful given its large contribution to the data base.  Finally, the amicus brief results 
deserve further qualitative analysis.  It may be obvious from reading the opinions of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, or another Justice, that a particular brief helped influence a result even 
if that influence cannot be demonstrated through empirical research.  A combination of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis may be more appropriate in considering the influence 
of amicus briefs on the voting behavior of a Justice. 
Despite these limitations, our work can contribute to the research on the legacy of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.  We are able to confirm that federalism, as opposed to purely 
“politics,” predicts Chief Justice Rehnquist’s voting behavior over time.  We are also able to 
describe the judicial role that is consistent with his federalism:  deference to state courts, 
concern about protecting federal pre-emption, and a comparatively restrained judicial role 
with some influence from political ideology.  Although the Rehnquist Court may be well 
known for its “federalism revolution,” Rehnquist appears to have helped move the Court in 
that direction through a relatively cautious judicial approach. 
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Appendix A: Methodology 
Data was collected on any Supreme Court decision in the 1986-2002 terms which 
considered the constitutionality of a state or federal action.  The data was drawn from the 
Supreme Court Database created by Harold Spaeth and archived by the S. Sidney Ulmer 
Project at the University of Kentucky.32 The cases were then coded for several attributes, 
including the primary issue considered in the case, the number of amicus briefs, and the 
types and number of groups and individuals which signed on to briefs urging the Court to 
validate or invalidate the government action under review.  Information on the amicus 
briefs was retrieved from the LEXIS Supreme Court briefs collection.  If the LEXIS copies 
of the briefs had incomplete information, student assistants looked at the microfiche copy of 
the brief to get the total number of signers for each brief.  Cases were coded for how the 
lower court treated the government action under review (if it was a federal or state court, if 
the lower court validated or invalidated the state action).  Intergovernmental organizations 
include groups like the National Conference of State Legislatures and the National 
Governors Association. 
 
Each case was also coded to reflect the ideology of the underlying government action.  
Liberal actions are those which favored the person accused of a crime, favored the civil 
rights or civil liberties claimant, favored affirmative action, favored neutrality in religion 
cases, and are pro-union, pro-environmental protection, and pro-underdog in economic 
disputes.  The determination of the ideology of the underlying government action relied on 
these definitions, derived from the Supreme Court database.  A government action was 
coded as liberal if the government action was invalidated and the Court decision was 
considered conservative (in the Supreme Court database) or if the government action was 
validated and the Court decision was coded as liberal.  The underlying government action 
was considered conservative if the government action was invalidated and the Court 
decision was considered liberal (in the Supreme Court database) or if the government action 
was validated and the Court decision was coded as conservative.   
 
To calculate the predicted probabilities for the other justices in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 7, models 
were run for each of the other 8 justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court.  Because 
the dependent variable is dichotomous—a justice votes to invalidate the case or to not 
invalidate (that is, validate) the government action—the appropriate statistical technique is 
probit, a maximum likelihood estimator.  Probit coefficients are not particularly meaningful 
on their own merits, so one way to bring meaning to them is to look at predicted 
probabilities of a vote to invalidate given a particular case profile.  The baseline profile we 
use in the analyses in this chapter is a case which reviews a state government action (as 
opposed to a federal government action), was invalidated by a state court before it came to 
the Supreme Court, had no participation by the Solicitor General as an amicus, had the 
average number of states supporting invalidation (-4.70 states, or 4.7 states favoring 
validation), had the average number of intergovernmental lobby organizations (-.39, or .39 
groups favoring validation) as amici.  Additionally, the baseline case did not involve 
individual rights or preemption.  Perhaps most importantly, the baseline case is a review of 
a government action that is conservative. 
 
                                                 
32 http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/databases.htm 
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The full probit model for Chief Justice Rehnquist’s votes is below, with standard errors in 
parentheses.  There are 604 observations, and * denotes coefficients significant at the .05 
level (two-tailed test), and ** denotes coefficients significant at the .01 level. 
 
Federal Action  -0.1532 
(0.1636) 
Lower Court-Federal Court Validated 0.8474** 
(0.2298) 
Lower Court-State Court Validated 0.4590* 
(0.2085) 
Lower Court-Federal Court Invalidated 0.2727 
(0.2205) 
Solicitor General Amicus Favoring Validation  -0.4575** 
(0.1610) 
Solicitor General Amicus Favoring Invalidation 0.4491* 
(0.2198) 
Net Number of States Favoring Invalidation  0.0018 
(0.0053) 
State Government Organizations Favoring Invalidation  -0.0145 
(0.0330) 
Ideology of Challenged Government Action 0.5959** 
(0.1291) 
Issue in case is individual rights  0.1495 
(0.1245) 
Issue in case is preemption  1.0573** 
(0.2394) 
Constant -1.1602** 
(.1993) 
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